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REDISTRIBUTION UNDER A PARTIALLY
PRIVATIZED SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM*
Kathryn L. Mooret
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, Social Security' has balanced two com-
peting policy objectives: equity and social adequacy.' Equity
means that each worker should receive a benefit that is direct-
ly related, or actuarially equivalent, to the amount of his or
her contributions.3 Social adequacy means that a certain stan-
dard of living should be provided for all contributors, regard-
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grateful to Richard Ausness, Jonathan Barry Forman, and Michael Healy for their
comments on an earlier draft and to Carol Parris for her research assistance.
1 For the purposes of this Article, the term Social Security will be used in its
generally accepted manner as referring only to the cash benefits provided by the
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance ("OASDI') program. The Old-Age
Survivors Insurance ("OASI") program provides benefits for retired workers and
their spouses and children and to survivors of deceased workers. The Disability
Insurance ("DI") program provides benefits for disabled workers and their spouses
and children and pays for rehabilitation services for the disabled. See Martynas A.
Ycas, The Issue Unresolved: Innovating and Adapting Disability Programs for the
Third Era of Social Security, 58 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 48, 49 (1995). Moreover,
since disability raises complex policy concerns that often differ from those raised
by old-age, see, e.g., ERIC R. KINGSON & EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, SOCIAL SECURITY
AND MEDICARE: A POLICY PRIMER 137-50 (1993), this Article will focus principally
on Social Security's provision of old-age benefits.
' As originally enacted, Social Security emphasized equity. See MERTON C.
BERNSTEIN & JOAN BRODSHAUG BERNSTEIN, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE SYSTEM THAT
WORKS 213-14 (1988). Since 1939, however, "the primary emphasis in the evolution
of [Social Security] has been on the concept of adequacy in the prevention of hard-
ship." J. DOUGLAS BROWN, ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 25 (1977); see also MAR-
THA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 215 (1979) (explaining that
welfare objectives served as one of the driving forces behind changes).
3 See ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 10 (4th ed. 1993); see also Karen C.
Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Women, Fairness, and Social Security, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1997). For a more detailed discussion of definitions of individ-
ual equity, see Edmund Outslay & James E. Wheeler, Separating the Annuity and
Income Transfer Elements of Social Security, 57 ACCT. REV. 716, 719-20 (1982).
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less of the level of their contributions4 and implies some de-
gree of income redistribution.5 Wilbur J. Cohen, a strong sup-
porter of the Social Security system and an important player
in its foundation,6 once declared that the balancing of equity
and adequacy is "the art that has made Social Security an
acceptable system."7 Critics of the system, in contrast, argue
that the inherent conflict in these two goals makes the system
defective.8
4 See MYERS, supra note 3, at 10; Burke & McCouch, supra note 3, at 1211.
' One of the three conventional arguments made for government provision of
Social Security is income redistribution. (The other two arguments are market
failures and paternalism.) See Marilyn E. Manser, Historical and Political Issues in
Social Security Financing, in SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 21, 29 (Felicity
Skidmore ed., 1981) ("The goal of redistribution was important in the creation of
the U.S. social security system during the Great Depression. Many aged persons
were poor, and their needs were not being met adequately by existing programs.");
see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES
FOR ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY 13 (GAO/HEHS-98-33, July 1998) ("The ap-
propriate balance between individual equity and social adequacy is a fundamental
issue surrounding Social Security's benefit structure and reflects the extent to
which the program redistributes income among workers and beneficiaries.") [herein-
after GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY].
' Cohen was research assistant to the Executive Director of the Committee on
Economic Security (1934-1935), the committee that recommended the establishment
of Social Security. See Wilbur J. Cohen, The Social Security Act of 1935: Reflec-
tions Fifty Years Later, in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY OF
1935, AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SO-
CIAL SECURITY ACT 5 (50th Anniversary ed. 1985) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
7 WILBUR J. COHEN & MILTON FRIEDMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY: UNIVERSAL OR
SELECTIVE? 68 (1972).
8 See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1998
GREENBOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 97-98 (Comm. Print 1998) ("[Critics
of Social Security] argue that by combining the goals of social adequacy, which is
welfare-related, with individual equity, which loosely ties benefits to taxes paid,
the program has becomes a mishmash that accomplishes neither goal well and cre-
ates inequities.") [hereinafter 1998 GREENBOOK]; see, e.g., COHEN & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 7, at 36. (According to Milton Friedman, "[Social Security] gives too
much attention to 'need' to be justified as return for taxes paid, and it gives too
much attention to taxes paid to be justified as adequately linked to need."); PETER
J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION 3-4 (1980) (arguing
that the inherent conflict in adequacy and equity is the source of all of the
program's major defects); LEWIS B. SOLOMON & GEOFFREY A. BARROw, PRIVATIZA-
TION OF SOCIAL SECURITY: A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS 9, 13 (1995) ("The sys-
tem attempts to provide two fundamentally different services-social insurance and
welfare-and succeeds at neither."); see also GAO, SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 5,
at 26-27 (discussing annuity-welfare model and arguments for separating equity
and social adequacy elements of Social Security).
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Once viewed as a radical recommendation, 9 proposals to
privatize Social Security abound. Moreover, proposals to pri-
vatize partially Social Security are beginning to receive serious
consideration. Accordingly, this Article will address the like-
ly effect of partial privatization on Social Security's ability to
redistribute income. For the purposes of this Article, privatiza-
tion will refer to proposals that involve individuals directing
their own pre-funded individual accounts and bearing the risk
of investing in the private market and not to proposals that
involve the federal government investing in the private market
and bearing the risk. This Article will treat proposals that
"add" a defined contribution account on to the current Social
Security system as well as proposals that "carve out" a defined
contribution account-that is, divert a portion of existing pay-
roll tax revenues to fund private accounts-as partial privatiza-
tion proposals."
Part I of this Article will begin by describing how the So-
cial Security system currently balances equity with social ade-
quacy. Part II of this Article will then describe some of the
pending partial privatization proposals and explain how they
will alter this balance. Next, Part III will explain why enact-
ment of the proposals could put Social Security's redistributive
role at risk. Finally, Part IV of this Article will explain why
Social Security's redistributive role should be preserved.
I. EQUITY AND SOCIAL ADEQUACY UNDER THE CURRENT
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Among other things, Social Security pays old-age benefits
to qualified retired workers. 2 In calculating these benefits,
Social Security uses a complex benefit formula 3 that takes
' See Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71
TEMP. L. REV. 148-49 & n.106 and authorities cited therein.
10 See Prof. Moore's article, supra note 9, at 148-53, and Part II for a discus-
sion of some of the Social Security privatization proposals under consideration.
" But see RESEARCH & POLY COMM., COMM. OF ECON. DEV., FDING SOCIAL
SECURITY 47-48 (1997) [hereinafter FIXING SOCIAL SECURITYI (suggesting that "add
on" accounts do not constitute partial privatization of the system).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1994). It also pays disability benefits to qualified
disabled workers, see 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1994), and derivative or auxiliary bene-
fits to certain family members of retired or deceased workers. See 42 U.S.C.
402(b)-(h).
3 To calculate old-age benefits, the government begins by determining the
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into account the worker's earning record.14 By tying benefits
to earnings, the system is designed to promote equity15 be-
cause Social Security contributions are based on earnings. 16
The Social Security system is designed to promote social
adequacy in a number of ways. First, Social Security uses a
weighted benefit formula to calculate benefits; that is, as a
person's average earnings increase, the formula replaces a
decreasing percentage of adjusted average earnings." Second,
number of years upon which to base benefits. See SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL
SECURITY: UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 11 (1996). Currently, for everyone born
after 1928 and retiring in 1991 or later, the base is 35 years. See id. Earnings
are then indexed for inflation. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1994). Average adjusted
earnings, or "average indexed monthly earnings," are then calculated by taking the
best 35 years of earnings, adding them together and dividing by 420 (the number
of months in 35 years). See id. Average adjusted earnings are then multiplied by
a progressive benefit formula to determine the "primary insurance amount" ("PIA")
or how much of the average adjusted earnings should be replaced. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 415(a). The formula replaces a higher percentage of adjusted average earnings
the lower one's average earnings were so that the ratio of benefits to average
earnings is higher for those with low average earnings than for those with high
average earnings. Disability benefits are calculated in a similar manner, but fewer
than 35 years may be taken into account in determining the PIA for disabled
workers. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(2). For a more detailed discussion of how Social
Security benefits are calculated, see, for example, 1998 SOCIAL SECURITY EX-
PLAINED 157-275 (CCH 1998); MYERS, supra note 3, at 47-129; EUGENE C.
STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
RIGHT AND WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 75-83 (1994).
" The special minimum benefit is an exception to this rule. It is based on
years of covered employment rather than earnings. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(C);
see also 1998 GREENBOOK, supra note 8, at 25.
1" Recall that equity means that benefits are related to contributions. See
MYERS, supra note 3, at 10.
16 The Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101 et seq. (1994),
requires that employers, 26 U.S.C. § 3111(a) (1994), and employees, 26 U.S.C.
§ 3101(a), each "contribute" 6.2% of wages, up to a maximum taxable wage base,
indexed for inflation, 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1), to finance old-age survivor and dis-
ability benefits. The taxable wage base was equal to $68,400 in 1998. See 1998
SOCIAL SECURITY EXPLAINED, supra note 13, 1 208, at 40 (listing the taxable wage
base for each year from 1937 through 1998). The self-employed are required to
make similar contributions. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1994). For 1997 through
1999, 5.35% of the payroll tax is allocated to the OASI program while .85% is
allocated to the DI program. Beginning in 2000 and thereafter, 5.3% of the tax is
to be allocated to the OASI program while .9% is to be allocated to the DI pro-
gram. 1997 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DIS-
ABILITY INS. TR. FUNDS ANN. REP. 35, Tbl. II.B1 [hereinafter TR. FUNDS ANN.
REP.].
1' Specifically, in 1998, the formula replaced 90% of the first $477 or less of
average indexed monthly earnings ("AIME"), plus 32% of any AIME above $477 to
$2,875, plus 15% of any AIME above $2,875. See 1998 SOCIAL SECURITY EX-
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Social Security provides a special minimum benefit to workers
with very low wages and long covered work histories. 8 Final-
ly,'9 Social Security pays "auxiliary"20 or "derivative"2' bene-
fits to certain family members of retired, disabled, and de-
ceased workers22 to satisfy the presumptive needs23 of such
dependents and survivors.24
PLAINED, supra note 13, 512, at 183. For a more detailed discussion on how to
calculate Social Security benefits, see supra notes 13-16 and authorities cited
therein.
" See 42 U.S.C. §415(a)(1)(C). See generally MYERS, supra note 3, at 87-88
(discussing special minimum benefit).
" Social Security's intergenerational transfers, see infra text accompanying
notes 25-29, which have resulted in the redistribution of income from working
generations to retired generations, may be viewed as another way that Social
Security has been designed to promote social adequacy. See STEUERLE & BAKIJA,
supra note 13, at 13-14 ("Social Security was meant to redistribute resources to
the elderly from the rest of the population because the elderly as a group were
considered less well-off .... The immediate effect of [the new tax system] was to
redistribute income from later generations that, on average, were better-off to
earlier generations that, on average, were worse-off."). In addition, its disability
benefits may be viewed as a means of promoting social adequacy.
20 See MYERS, supra note 3, at 57-59 (referring to benefits received by family
members of retired or disabled workers as "auxiliary benefits"); Jonathan Barry
Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement Program: Partial
Integration and a Credit for Dual-Earner Couples, 45 TAX LAW. 915, 924-25 (1992)
(referring to benefits to dependents and survivors of workers as "auxiliary bene-
fits").
21 See Burke & McCouch, supra note 3, at 1213 (referring to benefits received
by family members of retired, disabled, or deceased workers as "derivative" bene-
fits).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)-(h) (1994).
' See, e.g., Final Report of the [1937-38] Advisory Council on Soc. Sec., reprint-
ed in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 175, 189 ("Payment of supplementary
allowances to annuitants who have wives over 65 will increase the average benefit
in such a manner as to meet the greatest social need with the minimum increase
in cost."); see also Burke & McCouch, supra note 3, at 1214-15. ("When derivative
benefits were first introduced, they were justified on grounds of social adequacy. A
supplementary benefit for a retired worker's dependent family members was con-
sidered necessary, in view of the relatively low level of primary benefits during
the early years of social security."); Forman, supra note 20, at 935-36 (noting that
auxiliary benefits help program provide socially adequate benefits to all beneficia-
ries).
2 There is little doubt that Social Security's derivative benefit provisions have
effectively redistributed income from single earners to married couples, and partic-
ularly married couples with only one earner. See, e.g., Carol T.F. Bennett, The
Social Security Benefit Structure: Equity Considerations of the Family as its Basis,
69 AM. ECON. REV. 227 (1979) (using model to simulate social benefit and contri-
bution structure, finds that for workers entering the OASD system in 1978, re-
turns on Social Security contributions vary more by family pattern than any other
variable. Single workers with no dependents have lowest ratio of expected benefit
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Until now, Social Security has been able to promote both
equity and social adequacy by paying nearly all participants
far more in benefits than they paid in taxes." These re-
turns," or intergenerational transfers,27 are a natural re-
to expected contributions while single-earner married couples with dependents have
highest ratio of expected benefit to expected contributions); Michael J. Boskin et
al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and Within Generations, 40
NAT'L TAX J. 19 (1987) (showing single-earner couples have highest expected pres-
ent value of retirement benefits); Richard V. Burkhauser, Are Women Treated
Fairly in Today's Social Security System, 19 GERONTOLOGIST 242 (1979) (showing
one-earner families receive better returns than either two-earner families or un-
married individuals); James E. Duggan et al., Returns Paid to Early Social Securi-
ty Cohorts, II CONTEMiPORARY POLY ISSUES 1, 8 (1993) (finding that married cou-
ples receiving derivative benefits have experienced higher returns than single
workers); Michael D. Hurd & John B. Shoven, The Distributional Impact of Social
Security, in PENSIONS, LABOR, AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 193, 212 (David A. Wise
ed., 1985) (showing that for 1969, 1975, and 1979, married couples received the
highest rates of return); Outslay & Wheeler, supra note 3, at 716 (showing single-
earner family unit receives best rate of return under Social Security); Martha N.
Ozawa, Who Receives Subsidies Through Social Security, and How Much?, 27 So-
CIAL WORK: J. NAT'L ASS'N SOC. WORKERS 129, 131-32 (1982) (using benefit-contri-
bution ratios for hypothetical workers, contends that for workers retiring at age 65
in 1982, married workers will receive higher subsidies than will unmarried work-
ers).
Whether this is an appropriate redistributive policy, however, is subject to
considerable debate. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
See MICHAEL J. BOSKIN, Too MANY PROMISES: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF
SOCIAL SECURITY 35-37 & tbl. 2.10 (Twentieth Century Fund ed., 1986) (internal
rate of return for age cohort reaching 65 by 1970 ranges from 9.7 to 7.5 and for
cohort reaching 65 by 1980 return ranges from 6.6 to 5.6); ALICIA H. MUNNELL,
THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 79, tbl. 4-2 (Brookings Inst. ed., 1982)
(showing favorable benefit-tax ratios for hypothetical workers retiring in 1979);
STEUERLE & BAKIJA, supra note 13, at 108 ("[A]lmost all individuals who have re-
tired in any year between 1940 and today-no matter what their income level or
family type-have received large positive transfers from Social Security beyond the
sum of their contributions to the system and a reasonable rate of return on those
contributions."); Duggan et al., supra note 24, at 8 (1895-1922 birth cohort received
aggregate real return of 9.1% annually); Hurd & Shoven, supra note 24, at 212
(retirees who were between 58 and 64 in 1969 earned a real rate of return of ap-
proximately 8%); Outslay & Wheeler, supra note 3, at 716 (showing that depend-
ing on assumptions used, as of 1982, most, if not all, workers received benefits in
excess of actuarially computed annuity at retirement); Ozawa, supra note 24, at
132 (using benefit-contribution ratios for hypothetical workers, shows that all
workers retiring at age 65 in 1982 will receive much greater benefits than their
past contributions plus interest warrant); Anthony Pellechio & Gordon Goodfellow,
Individual Gains and Losses from Social Security Before and After the 1983
Amendments, 3 CATO J. 417 (1983) (showing intergenerational transfers both before
and after 1983 amendments).
26 For a discussion of the various methods used to calculate Social Security's
"money's worth," see Dean R. Leimer, A Guide to Social Security's Money's Worth
[Vol. 64: 3
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sult28 of Social Security's operation, basically, as an immature
pay-as-you-go system.2
Since Social Security is rapidly reaching maturity," how-
ever, its days of providing all participants with such returns
are rapidly coming to a close. A mature pay-as-you-go system
can only provide retirees with an average return on contribu-
tions equal to the growth in real wages (which is projected to
be about 1 percent each year for the foreseeable future),31 and
only if the population and tax rate remain constant over
Issues, 58 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 3 (1995).
2 See Alan S. Blinder, Why is the Government in the Pension Business?, in
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS: PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 17, 24-26 (Susan M. Wachter ed., 1988) (explaining how
Social Security has transferred income across generations).
28 See HENRY J. AARON, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 41 (Brookings
Inst. ed., 1982) (noting that Social Security "has provided ... expected benefits
worth far more than taxes for all people who have received benefits to date, and
[that] it will continue to do so until the system is fully mature."); BERNSTEIN &
BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 235-36 (concluding that Social Security's excessive
benefits to its initial participants are inevitable in any pay-as-you-go system);
Alicia H. Munnell, Comment [on World Bank Study], in SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT
ROLE FOR THE FUTURE? 197 (Peter A. Diamond et al. eds., 1996) (emphasizing
that first generation, inevitably, does well in a pay-as-you-go system); FIXING SO-
CIAL SECURITY, supra note 11, at 11 ("Simply put, in the early years, pay-as-you-
go systems pay retirees very high benefits relative to taxes paid during the lim-
ited number of years they contributed to the system.").
29 "A pay-as-you-go social security system is one in which annual revenues
dedicated to the system approximately equal annual expenditures." AARON, supra
note 28, at 7. For a discussion of the difference between the operation of a funded
system and a pay-as-you-go system, see CAROLYN L. WEAVER, THE CRISIS IN So-
CIAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORIGINS 119-21 (1982).
When originally enacted, Social Security provided for the creation of a sub-
stantial reserve to fund future benefits. The creation of such a reserve, however,
was widely criticized. Accordingly, in 1939, Congress amended the program to
increase benefits to the first generation of retirees and to reduce the build-up of a
reserve. Since 1939, Social Security has operated principally on a pay-as-you-go
basis. See Moore, supra note 9, at 139-40.
" Indeed, one commentator believes Social Security reached maturity in about
1975. See Lawrence H. Thompson, Overview of Social Security Issues, II 1994-1996
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY: PRESENTATIONS TO THE COUNCIL 279
(1997) [hereinafter Thompson, Overview].
" See C. Eugene Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the
21st Century, 60 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 37, 42 (1997) (noting that the Social Securi-
ty trustees recently have assumed that real wages will grow at an average of
about 1% per year in the future, which is about the same as the average since
1950.); see also TR. FUNDS ANN. REP., supra note 16, at 58 (stating that "under
intermediate alternative, real-wage differential is projected to be between 0.0 and
1.0 percent for the years 1997 through the year 2015, thereafter remaining at the
ultimate assumed differential of 0.9 percent.").
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time. 2 Since the working population is projected to shrink
vis-a-vis the beneficiary population,33 Social Security faces the
specter of providing future retirees with an average return of
less than 1 percent. 4 Moreover, as long as Social Security re-
tains its redistributive provisions, it must, as currently struc-
tured, necessarily provide some higher- and perhaps middle-
income workers with even lower, or negative, returns.35
32 The following formula explains why retirees will receive a return on their
contributions equal to the growth in real wages if the population and tax rate
remain constant over time. Assume that w is the average covered money wage, W
is the number of covered workers, R is the number of retirees receiving benefits,
and t is the payroll tax. A total of twW will be paid into the system, which can
finance an average benefit payment of tw(W/R). In a stable population, W/R will
be constant over time so that a fixed payroll tax will be able to finance benefits
equal to a fixed percentage of average wages. Accordingly, the average return will
equal the rate of real growth in wages, if any. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE FU-
TURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 127-28 (1977); Blinder, supra note 27, at 21; and Moore,
supra note 9, at 143 n.73; see also Henry J. Aaron, The Social Insurance Paradox,
32 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 371-74 (1966) (showing that a pay-as-you-go
social insurance system can increase the welfare of each person if the sum of the
rates of growth and real wages exceeds the rate of interest).
' In 1950, there were about 16.5 covered workers for each beneficiary. See
Thompson, Overview, supra note 30, at 279. By 1996, the ratio had fallen to ap-
proximately 3.3 workers for every Social Security beneficiary, TR. FUNDS ANN.
REP., supra note 16, at 21, and is projected to fall to 2.0:1 by 2030. Id. at 124.
Mr. Thompson notes that the increased retiree-to-worker ratio constitutes a perma-
nent shift in the projected age distribution in our population because the fertility
rate is expected to hold constant-or fall even more-while mortality rates simul-
taneously improve. See Thompson, Overview, supra note 30, at 279; Lawrence H.
Thompson, Altering the Public/Private Mix of Retirement -Incomes, in SOCIAL SECU-
RITY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS: PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 209, 210 (Susan M. Wachter ed., 1988); see also Michael J. Boskin, Com-
ment, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSIONS: PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 227 (Susan M. Wachter ed., 1988) (agreeing with
Thompson's characterization).
" Applying the preceding formula, in a shrinking working population vis-a-vis
retired population, W/R will decrease over time unless real wages generate ade-
quately larger contributions. Thus, a fixed payroll tax will only be able to finance
benefits equal to a decreasing percentage of average wages. See I 1994-1996 ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY REPORT: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at
104 (1997) ("Under present law, the average real rate of return on Social Security
taxes is projected to fall to about 2% on average for workers reaching age 65 in
2020, and to level out at 1 to 2% on average for younger workers and future
generations.") [hereinafter I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT]; see also JOHN
GEANAKOPLOS ET AL., WOULD A PRIVATIZED SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM REALLY PAY
A HIGHER RATE OF RETURN? (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 98-6 8-13, 1998) (explaining why projected rates of return on Social Security
are so low).
" Obviously, if you give one participant proportionately more, you have to give
[Vol. 64: 3
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As a result of these projections, proposals to privatize
partially Social Security abound." Proponents of partial pri-
vatization37 typically point to the average long-term rates of
return on equities" (which have been about 7 percent per
another participant proportionately less. See Thompson, Overview, supra note 30,
at 290 ("This illustrates a couple of points. First, the system is explicitly
redistributive. Thus, if you're going to give somebody proportionately more, you
have to give somebody proportionately less. It is a zero sum game. A zero sum
game adds up to those cohort-wide rates of return. Second, if the system is going
to continue to be redistributive, when a man who earns the maximum adds in his
employer's share the total he receives is going to be less than one. It follows as
night follows day-if somebody is going to get back more than one, somebody has
got to get back less than one."); see also C. Eugene Steuerle & Jon M. Bakija,
How Social Security Redistributes Income, 62 TAX NOTES 1763, 1770 (1994)
("Lifetime contributions begin to exceed lifetime benefits for high-wage single males
retiring in the 1980s. Positive net transfers are eliminated for high-/average-wage
two-earner couples retiring after the turn of the century ... [High-wage single
workers and two-earner couples retiring in the 2020s and later will face very large
negative transfers (or positive net lifetime taxes) from the system.").
" For example, seven of the thirteen members of the 1994-1996 Social Security
Advisory Council advocate the creation of individual accounts. See I ADVISORY
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 28 n.14, 30 n.20. Similarly, the Committee on
Economic Development recommends partial privatization of Social Security. See
FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 11. In addition, a number of bills that would
provide for the creation of individual accounts were introduced in the 105th Con-
gress. See, e.g., H.R. 4256, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3560, 105th Cong. (1998);
H.R. 3456, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 2369, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 2313, 105th Cong.
(1998); S. 1792, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3082, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2929,
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2782, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2768, 105th Cong. (1997);
H.R. 1611, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 321, 105th Cong. (1997). For a point-by-point
comparison of some of the proposals to reform Social Security, see Kelly Olsen,
Appendix: A Point-by-Point Comparison of Social Security Reform Plans, 13 BENE-
FITS Q. 88 (1997).
Some commentators and analysts go even further and recommend full privat-
ization of Social Security. See, e.g., DANIEL J. MITCHELL, CREATING A BETTER SO-
CIAL SECURITY SYSTEM FOR AMERICA (Heritage Foundation Roe Backgrounder No.
1109, 1997); WILLIAM G. SHIPMAN, RETIRING WITH DIGNITY: SOCIAL SECURITY VS.
PRIVATE MARKETS (Cato Project on Soc. Sec. Privatization No. 2, 1995).
" Investing in the private market does not require the creation of individual
accounts. Rather, the system's level of funding could be increased by increasing
taxes, cutting benefits, or both, and the proceeds invested in the private market
through a central trust fund. In fact, proponents of the 1994-1996 Advisory
Council's "Maintain Benefits" Plan recommend exploration of this option. See I
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 25-27.
" Some analysts object to comparing the current system's rates of return with
these proposed returns. See, e.g., DEAN BAKER, PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY: THE
WALL STREET FIX (Economic Pol'y Inst. Issue Brief No. 112, 1996)
<http./www.epinet.org/epibll2.html> (arguing that "relevant measure is not the
rate of return provided by Social Security benefits relative to the taxes paid in,
but rather the improvements in living standards over generations"); GEANAKOPLOS
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year over the last 100 years)39 and contend that partial pri-
vatization would benefit all workers, regardless of their income
level, because it would permit them to reap these higher re-
turns.
40
The following section briefly describes the partial privat-
ization proposals. It then explains how the proposals would
alter the system's present balance between equity and social
adequacy.
II. EQUITY AND SOCIAL ADEQUACY UNDER THE PARTIAL
PRIVATIZATION PROPOSALS
Typically, the partial privatization proposals provide for
two tiers of benefits. The first tier may entitle all participants
ET AL., supra note 34, at 13-23 (contending that such comparisons are inappro-
priate because they ignore transition costs and do not account for differences in
riskiness of investments); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SSA BENEFIT
ESTIMATE STATEMENT: ADDING RATE OF RETURN INFORMATION MAY NOT BE APPRO-
PRIATE 4-8 (GAO/HEHS-98-228, Sept. 1998) (discussing difficulty of determining
rate of return estimates under current system).
" See Narayana R. Kocherlakota, The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle, 34
J. ECON. LITERATURE 42, 42 (1996).
40 See, e.g., I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 36-49 (comparing
rates of return under the three Advisory Council proposals); FIXING SOCIAL SECU-
RITY, supra note 11, at 44 (recognizing that not everyone is likely to receive high-
er returns on their contributions but contending that investments in the private
sector are likely to improve the "money's worth" of contributions made by the
majority of younger workers"); NATIONAL COMM'N ON RETIREMENT POL'Y, THE 21ST
CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURITY PLAN 3 (introduced as S. 2313, 105th Cong.
(1998); H.R. 4256, 105th Cong. (1998)) ("The Commission is persuaded that most
Americans will receive more retirement income from the Social Security program if
individual savings accounts are incorporated into the system than they would
receive if traditional solutions alone were used to bring the system back into bal-
ance.") [hereinafter 21ST CENTURY PLAN]; Sylvester J. Schieber, The Need for So-
cial Security Reform and the Implications of Funding Through Personal Security
Accounts, 13 BENEFITS Q. 29, 38 (1997) ("According to the projections developed by
the Social Security actuaries for the Advisory Council, the PSA proposal offers the
potential for both low-wage and high-wage workers to become better off under a
proposal of this sort than under the extremely low rates of return provided under
the current system as a result of the funding of benefits that is an important
element of the proposal"); see also WILLIAM W. BEACH & GARETH G. DAVIS, SOCIAL
SECURITY'S RATE OF RETURN (Heritage Ctr. for Data Analysis No. CADA 98-01,
1998) (contending that Social Security rate of return for most Americans will be
vastly inferior to what they could expect from placing their payroll taxes in even
the most conservative private investments); Carrie Lips, The Working Poor and
Social Security Privatization: Restoring the Opportunity to Save (CATO Inst. ed.,
1998) (contending that the poor would benefit most from privatization).
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to a flat benefit regardless of earnings,4 ' or, in the alternative,
the first tier benefit may be based in part on earnings but
provide a greater return on lower wages than on higher wag-
es.42 First tier benefits are usually lower than benefits under
the current system and may provide for more,43 less," or the
same45 amount of redistribution as is provided under the cur-
"' For example, the Social Security Advisory Council's PSA plan provides for a
flat first tier benefit for all workers under age 25 in 1998 equal to $410 per
month in 1996 dollars, or the equivalent of 65% of the current poverty level for
an elderly person living alone or 76% of the benefit payable to a low wage worker
retiring in 1996. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 31.
42 For example, the Social Security Advisory Council's IA plan provides for a
first tier benefit that, like the current Social Security benefit, is based in part on
earnings. The proposal contemplates retaining the current 90% replacement rate
for low earnings, decreasing the replacement rate for middle earnings from 32% to
22.4% and decreasing the replacement rate for high earnings from 15% to 10.5%. I
ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 29; see also FIXING SOCIAL SECURI-
TY, supra note 11, at 38-39 (making similar proposal and recommending that
changes in replacement rates gradually be phased in between the years 1998 and
2030).
The National Commission on Retirement Policy ("NCRP") proposes both a
minimum benefit provision, for which individuals would be eligible after 20 covered
years of earnings, as well as a first tier benefit based in part on earnings. Like
the Social Security Advisory Council's IA plan and the Council for Economic
Development's proposal, the NCRP proposal would gradually decrease the 32% and
15% replacement rates. See 21ST CENTURY PLAN, supra note 40, at 8-10.
' By decreasing the current system's replacement rates for middle and high-
income workers, the Social Security Advisory Council's IA plan, the Council for
Economic Development proposal, and the NCRP proposal would increase redistribu-
tion from higher-income to lower-income workers. See supra note 42.
" A number of proposals would gradually decrease spousal benefits from one-
half of the worker's PIA to about one-third of the worker's PIA. See, e.g., I ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 29; FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note
11, at 17, 44; 21ST CENTURY PLAN, supra note 40, at 5-6. In doing so, the propos-
als would decrease the current system's redistribution from single earners and
two-earner married couples to one-earner married couples. Cf supra note 24. The
partial privatization proposals also tend to decrease disability benefits. See GAO,
SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 5, at 59-60 (describing how Advisory Council's IA
and PSA plans would reduce disability benefits).
" The General Accounting Office ("GAO") devised a method to adjust first tier
benefits to recover fully the subsidy higher-income workers currently provide lower-
income workers under the current Social Security system. The GAO began by de-
termining the average implicit rate of return each age group would receive from
Social Security. It then subtracted for each worker an amount equivalent to the
annuity that the worker's diverted taxes would have purchased if the worker had
earned her age group rate of return. By applying the same age group reduction to
everyone, the adjustment would achieve the current system's redistribution because
individuals earn different rates of return under Social Security depending on their
level of income. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF
A PROPOSAL TO PRIVATIZE TRUST FUND RESERVES 6-7 (GAO/HEHS-98-33 59-60,
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rent system. Second tier benefits require the creation of an
individual defined contribution account46 and consist of the
contributions to the individual account and any earnings or
losses thereon. Although, in theory, contributions to the second
tier need not be based solely on earnings,47 they almost in-
variably are. 8
By creating a second tier benefit funded solely by wage-
related contributions, the partial privatization proposals sever
Social Security's provision of equity from that of social adequa-
cy. Under the proposals, benefits from the second tier are di-
rectly related to contributions on earnings and any earnings or
losses on those contributions; no redistribution is contemplated
or provided in this second tier. Moreover, by subjecting partici-
pants to investment risk in the second tier benefit,49 the pro-
posals cannot, and do not, assure any level of benefit, let alone
socially adequate benefits, in the second tier.5°  Thus, the
1990) [hereinafter GAO, PRIVATIZE RESERVES].
46 The individual accounts may be called any of a variety of names, for exam-
ple, "personal security accounts," see I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34,
at 30, "individual accounts," see id. at 28, or "personal retirement accounts." See
FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 11, at 18.
17 See II 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY: REPORT OF THE
TECHNICAL PANEL ON TRENDS AND ISSUES IN RETIREMENT SAVINGS, 90 (1997) ("It
might be feasible to design the second pillar in such a way that, though it was a
defined contribution system, it 'credited' a smaller rate of return to high-earners'
pension contributions, and a higher return to those earning low wages.").
48 See, e.g., I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 28, 30 (proposing
mandatory additional contribution of 1.6% of covered payroll to fund As and pro-
posing reallocation of five percentage points of employee's share of the OASI tax
to fund PSAs); FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 11, at 18 (proposing manda-
tory additional contribution of 3% of covered payroll, with payments split evenly
between employees and employers to fund PRAs); 21ST CENTURY PLAN, supra note
40, at 3 (proposing refund of two percentage points of the current OASDI tax into
Individual Savings Accounts).
" For a discussion of the propriety of subjecting participants to investment
risk, see Moore, supra note 9, at 153-56.
" Interestingly, the proponents of the Advisory Council's PSA plan appear to
rely on the second tier for income adequacy. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT,
supra note 34, at 35 n.2 ("Since ultimately the PSA plan provides a flat benefit
for full-career workers, the retirement income adequacy provided through the cen-
tral defined benefit plan is not as large as in other plans, although the PSA ac-
counts are expected to more than make up for the difference.") The drafters, how-
ever, include no guarantees in the plan to assure that the individual "personal
security accounts" will provide some minimal amount of benefits. I ADVISORY
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 35 n.2.
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partial privatization proposals sever the balance between equi-
ty and social adequacy by creating a tier that is designed solely
to promote equity.
Some of the partial privatization proposals go even further
and fully sever the program's provision of equity from that of
social adequacy by creating a first tier benefit that is designed
solely to promote social adequacy. Those proposals, like the
Advisory Council's PSA plan, provide a flat benefit in the first
tier that is designed solely to assure some level of social ade-
quacy."1 Other partial privatization proposals, such as the
Advisory Council's IA plan, do not completely sever the
program's provision of equity from social adequacy. Instead,
they retain some degree of balance in the first tier by basing
the first tier benefit in part on earnings but providing a great-
er return on lower wages than on higher wages.
By severing Social Security's provision of equity from that
of social adequacy, the partial privatization proposals may
place Social Security's redistributive role at risk. The following
section explains why the proposals create this risk.
III. THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL ADEQUACY UNDER PARTIAL
PRIVATIZATION
Typically, proponents of partial privatization express sup-
port for Social Security's redistributive function as well as its
equitable role. 2 For example, on at least six separate occa-
sions in its 60-page report, the Committee for Economic Devel-
opment expressed commitment to the current system's goal of
redistributing income from higher-paid workers to lower-paid
51 The social adequacy guaranteed by the first tier in the PSA plan is rather
limited. "[F]or workers under age 25 in 1998, those with full careers under Social
Security (those with 35 or more years of covered employment) would on retire-
ment, receive a flat dollar benefit equal to $410 monthly in 1996 (equivalent to 65
percent of the current poverty level for an elderly person living alone or 76 per-
cent of the benefit payable to a low-wage worker retiring in 1996)." I ADVISORY
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 31. As discussed above, see supra note 50,
recognizing the limited nature of the guaranteed benefit, proponents point to the
second tier benefit for assurance that low-wage workers will ultimately receive
socially adequate benefits.
52 Proponents of complete privatization, in contrast, typically criticize Social
Security's redistributive role. See, e.g., PETER J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE
INHERENT CONTRADICTION 6 (1980).
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workers. 3 Indeed, on page 37 of the report, the Committee
declared in bold type, "CED believes that Social Security
should continue to provide an adequate safety net for all par-
ticipants. This requires continuation of the income redistri-
bution characteristics of the program, which has helped to
dramatically reduce poverty among the elderly."54 Similarly,
the Advisory Council stated in the second sentence describing
the Council's IA plan, "[tihe goal is to preserve the social ade-
quacy protections in the present Social Security benefit system
while still raising overall national retirement saving."5 Like-
wise, in a statement comparing the three Advisory Council
proposals, proponents of the IA and PSA plans declared, "All of
the plans considered by the Council have tried to insure the
adequacy of retirement income in comparison to poverty
thresholds." 6
Despite these expressions of support for Social Security's
redistributive role, increasing rates of return appears to be the
principal driving force57 behind the proposals for partial pri-
vatization." Indeed, the Committee for Economic Security de-
scribed the need for increased rates of return in the starkest of
terms. It contended that not only does Social Security face
13 See FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 11, at ix, 4, 17, 24, 36, 37.
5' FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 11, at 37.
I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 28.
56 I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 35; see also 21ST CENTURY
PLAN, supra note 40, at 8 (explaining that minimum benefit provision introduced
because "the progressivity of the traditional benefit structure within Social Security
must be increased, especially if an individual saving account element is included,
with which no progressive effect is assumed.").
"' Other justifications for partial privatization include unmasking the federal
government's general budget deficit and increasing the national savings rate and
American competitiveness. See GAO, PRIVATIZE RESERVES, supra note 45, at 1;
FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 11, at 13-15; I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT,
supra note 34, at 49-56. For a discussion of the effect of a funded system on na-
tional savings and the unmasking of the federal debt, see generally, Barry P.
Bosworth, Fund Accumulation: How Much? How Managed?, in SOCIAL SECURITY:
WHAT ROLE FOR THE FUTURE? 89, 102-08 (Peter A. Diamond et al. eds., 1996) and
Promoting National Saving Through Social Security Trust Funds, in SOCIAL
SECURITY'S LOOMING SURPLUSES: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 17-38 (Carolyn L.
Weaver ed., 1990).
" The fact that the proponents of the Advisory Council's IA and PSA plans
devoted 13 pages of their 22-page "Comparison of Plans" to comparing the rates of
return under the Advisory Council's three proposals gives an idea of the relative
importance of increased rates of return. See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra
note 34, at 36-49.
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fiscal insolvency, but that it also faces "political insolvency,"
which it defined as "the serious crisis in confidence in the sys-
tem which is eroding public support. Younger workers are,
with good reason, especially skeptical, believing correctly that
it will provide a very poor, even negative, return on their con-
tributions to the system."59
The partial privatization proposals are not designed to
increase rates of return under the first tier. First, they retain
the current system's pay-as-you-go funding structure which
limits the average return on contributions to the growth in real
wages.60 Moreover, the first tier benefit is designed to redis-
tribute income from the higher-paid to the lower-paid, either
by providing a flat benefit or a benefit that provides a greater
return on lower wages than on higher wages. This redistribu-
tion necessarily further reduces the rates of return higher- and
middle-income workers can receive from the first tier.61 In
contrast, the second tier benefit is designed solely to increase
rates of return by eliminating any redistribution and pre-fund-
ing benefits.
If the partial privatization proposals are as successful as
proponents predict, higher- and middle-income workers should
receive substantially higher rates of return from their second
tier benefit than from their first tier benefit. Indeed, the larger
the second tier, the starker should the differential between the
first and the second tier appear to higher- and middle-income
workers.
For example, proponents of the PSA plan, which would
divert 5 percentage points of the current payroll tax to the
second tier, project that maximum-wage workers would receive
about 80 percent of their total benefit from their individual
personal security account,62 while less than 40 percent of
their contributions would go to fund that account." The PSA
5' FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 11, at ix.
'o See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
6 See supra note 35.
62 See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 46.
6 Proponents of the PSA plan propose that 5 percentage points of the current
12.4% OASDI tax be diverted to the "personal security accounts." In addition, the
proponents propose a 72-year payroll tax increase of 1.52%. I ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 34, at 30. Thus, for the first 72 years of the plan, the 5% tax
used to fund the personal security accounts would only constitute about 36% of
the total 13.92% (1.52+12.4%) payroll tax. Id.
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proponents further project that average-wage workers would
receive about 62 percent of their total benefit from their indi-
vidual personal security account 'while less than 40 percent
of their contributions would go to fund that account.6" Propo-
nents of the IA plan, which would be funded by an additional
1.6 percent payroll tax contribution, project that maximum-
wage workers would receive just under 40 percent of their total
benefit from their individual account, 6 while less than 12 per-
cent of their total payroll taxes would go to fund that bene-
fit.67 Average-wage workers are projected to receive about 27
percent of their benefits from the IA plan's individual ac-
counts," while less than 12 percent of their total payroll taxes
would go to fund those benefits. Only low-wage workers are
projected to receive only a slightly higher percentage of their
benefits from their second tier benefit than the percentage of
the payroll taxes they pay to fund those benefits.69
If partial privatization were adopted and individual ac-
counts were as successful as proponents predict, their very
success could place the first tier at risk. Higher- and middle-
income workers could look at the substantially higher rates of
return from the second tier and ask that the first tier be elimi-
nated and all of their contributions fund the second tier. In
fact, Professors Jerry Mashaw and Theodore Marmor argue
" See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 46.
6 See supra note 63.
6 See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 46.
Proponents of the IA plan propose that individual accounts be funded by an
additional 1.6% tax. I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 34, at 30. The 1.6%
tax would constitute about 11.4 % of the total 14% (1.6%-12.4%) payroll tax. Id.
6 See I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, at 46.
Low-wage workers are projected to receive about 42% of their benefit from
the second tier benefit of the PSA plan, see I ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra
note 34, at 46, while about 36% of their total payroll tax will go to fund that
benefit. See supra note 63. Low-wage workers are expected to receive about 20% of
their total benefit from the second tier IA benefit, see I ADVISORY COUNCIL RE-
PORT, supra note 34, at 46, while about 11.4% of their total payroll tax will fund
that benefit. See supra note 67.
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that the real risk with partial privatization is the inexorable
pressure it would create for full privatization." They contend:
Investment of some Social Security funds in equities, rather
than Treasury securities, will of course improve the investment
performance of Social Security. But if this investment is done in a
privatized form, it will appear that the improvement has come
through privatization of accounts rather than from a simple shift in
investment holdings. And, because most workers tend to ignore the
life insurance, dependents' benefits, and inflation protection that are
a part of the Social Security pension package, this argument may be
persuasive.
Even more importantly, workers may ignore the crucial protec-
tion that social insurance provides to everyone against low average
lifetime earnings, poor performance of their individual investments,
or against higher taxes or intrafamily transfers to support those who
do have those experiences. The less stake that American workers
believe themselves to have in the collective provision of retirement
benefits through Social Security, the more likely political support for
the system is to erode. Partial privatization in this scenario would
be destabilizing rather than anchoring. It could lead to the very de-
struction of the economic security that "reform" was supposed to
preserve.7
Of course, it is not certain that partial privatization would
result in the ultimate dismantling of the current defined bene-
fit system. First, there is no guarantee that partial privatiza-
70 See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore Marmor, The Great Social Security Scare,
in THE AM. PROSPECT n.29 (Nov.-Dec. 1996) <http:J/epn.org/prospect29/
29mash.html>.
" Id.; see also Social Security Reform Options: Preparing for the 21st Century,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Comm.
on Finance, 104th Cong. 58 (1996) (statement of Robert J. Myers) ("[I]t is my firm
belief that, if the Social Security program is partially privatized by instituting a
system of personal savings accounts and, at the same time, reducing the level of
Social Security benefits, the inevitable result will be the destruction of the Social
Security program. Higher-income persons will become less and less supportive, and
the praiseworthy sharing of the economic-security risk in connection with retire-
ment among persons of all income levels will be lost."); Karen C. Burke &
Grayson M.P. McCouch, Privatizing Social Security: Eight Myths, 74 TAX NOTES
1167, 1173 (1997) ("In a two-tier system like the one discussed in the Advisory
Council Report, the bottom tier of benefits might prove an irresistible target for
reduction or elimination, ultimately forcing many low earners onto the public as-
sistance rolls."); Lawrence H. Thompson, The Advantages and Disadvantages of
Different Social Welfare Strategies, 57 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 3, 8 (1994) (noting
that higher-income workers in the United States sometimes argue that they should
not be required to participate in Social Security because they could get a higher
return on their contributions if invested privately).
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tion would be as successful as proponents predict. Indeed,
there has been a great deal of debate on this issue."
Moreover, even if it were successful and most higher- and
middle-income workers were to receive substantially higher
rates of return from their second tier benefit, it is possible that
rather than decreasing support for the first tier, success in the
second tier could increase support for the first tier. Flush with
their successes in the second tier, higher- and middle-income
workers could feel more altruistic and thus more supportive of
the first tier.73 While this is possible, it does not appear con-
sistent with the current demand for higher rates of return that
is giving rise to the so-called "political insolvency" of the cur-
rent system. Nor does it appear consistent with trends in char-
itable contributions. Charitable giving does not steadily rise as
income rises. Rather, the percentage of household income de-
voted to charitable contributions remains fairly constant until
income exceeds $100,000 per year.74 Even then, households
72 See, e.g., GEANAKOPLOS ET AL., supra note 34 (contending that partially pri-
vatized system would not necessarily pay higher rate of return); JOHN MUELLER,
CAN FINANCIAL ASSETS BEAT SOCIAL SECURITY?: NOT IN THE REAL WORLD (Nation-
al Comm. to Preserve Soc. Sec. and Medicare, 1997) (arguing that ending pay-as-
you-go financing would lower the total return on retirement saving); Robert J.
Myers, Privatization of Social Security: A Good Idea?, J. AM. SOCY C.L.U. &
CHFC, July 1996, at 42 ("If such huge amounts of money were available for in-
vestment in common stocks, then it is likely that rates of return will be lower
than historical ones. Such massive new investment would probably produce some
desirable economic growth, but there are limits to this effect. Moreover, the vast
majority of the private contributions would go into the secondary capital markets,
rather than into issues which would generate new capital.").
" Randall Justice, a student in my social welfare legislation seminar, deserves
credit for this argument. Mr. Justice also argued that the fact that until now the
general public has accepted Social Security's redistributive features suggests that
middle- and higher-income workers would not abandon the first tier if Social Secu-
rity were partially privatized. It is worth noting, however, that as an immature
pay-as-you-go system, Social Security has not yet required workers, within genera-
tions, to sacrifice equity for redistribution. See supra text accompanying notes 25-
29. Thus, history does not fully test the political support for Social Security's
redistributive provisions.
14 See VIRGINIA HODGKINSON & MURRAY WEITZMAN, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING
IN THE UNITED STATES D148-49, tbl. I (Indep. Sector 1996). Households with in-
comes under $10,000 on average contribute 1.9% of household income to charity;
households with incomes from $10,000 to $19,999 on average contribute 1.3% of
household income to charity; households with incomes from $20,000 to $29,999 on
average contribute 1.5% of household income to charity; households with incomes
from $30,000 to $39,999 on average contribute 1.5% of household income to chari-
ty; households with incomes from $40,000 to $49,999 on average contribute 1.0% of
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with income under $10,000 contribute the second highest per-
centage of income to charity (1.9 percent); they are exceeded
only by households with incomes equal to or greater than
$100,000 (which give 3.0 percent of their annual income to
charity).5 Absent altruism, workers might still support the
first tier if they recognized that it provided other things of
value, such as protection against inflation and protection
against poor performance in their individual investment ac-
counts. The fact that most workers tend to ignore the life in-
surance, dependents' benefits, and inflation protection that the
current Social Security system offers, 6 however, makes it ap-
pear unlikely that most workers would value these other bene-
fits the first tier would provide.
Finally, it is possible that even if the first tier were dis-
mantled, the replacement system could expressly provide for
redistribution. For example, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Kent A.
Smetters, and Jan Walliser developed a model that would
gradually fully privatize Social Security while retaining its
redistributive effects by providing for matching contributions to
private accounts on a progressive basis and financing transi-
tion costs with a consumption tax." Providing for progressive
matching contributions, however, would not guarantee all
workers "socially adequate" benefits. Rather, it would subject
all workers to investment risk on all of their benefits. While
progressive matching contributions would assure some redistri-
bution, it would not guarantee social adequacy.
household income to charity, households with incomes from $50,000 to $59,999 on
average contribute 1.5% of household income to charity; households with incomes
from $60,000 to $74,999 on average contribute 1.5% of household income to chari-
ty; households with incomes from $75,000 to $99,999 on average contribute 1.4% of
household income to charity;, and households with incomes of $100,000 or more on
average contribute 3.0% of household income to charity. Id.
75 Id.
7' See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 70, at 4 (noting that "most workers tend
to ignore the life insurance, dependents' benefits, and inflation protection that are
a part of the Social Security pension package.").
7 Laurence J. Kotlikoff et al., Social Security: Privatization and Progressivity,
88 AM. ECON. REV. 137 (1998); see also Joseph G. Simanis, The Weighted Benefit
Formula-A Method of Redistribution, 57 SOC. SEcuRrrY BULL. 102 (1994) (describ-
ing variety of methods used by a variety of countries to redistribute income
through Social Security programs).
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Proponents of complete privatization may find this predic-
tion comforting. Indeed, the first issue of the Cato Project on
Social Security Privatization is titled: Dismantling the Pyra-
mid: The How and Why of Privatizing Social Security.78
Those who believe that Social Security can and should play a
role in securing income adequacy for the retired elderly, how-
ever, may find this distressing. The following section discusses
why it is important that Social Security preserve its
redistributive role.
IV. IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL SECURITY'S REDISTRIBUTIVE ROLE
When Social Security was originally enacted, the poor-
house was a reality for many older Americans near the end of
their lives.7" In fact, "[p]erhaps the most fundamental reason
for the adoption of a Social Security system was the desire for
some progressive redistribution to help meet the needs of the
elderly."" Although there is some debate as to how effective
Social Security has actually been in redistributing income
within generations,"' it appears clear that Social Security has
78 KARL BORDEN, DISMANTLING THE PYRAMID: THE WHY AND How OF PRIVATIZ-
ING SOCIAL SECURITY (Cato Project on Soc. Sec. Privatization SSP No. 1, 1995).
71 See Robert M. Ball, The Original Understanding of Social Security: Implica-
tions for Later Developments, in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRI-
SIS 17, 19 (Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988) (noting that when
Social Security was enacted, "[t]he poorhouse towards the end of life, with all its
horrors, was a very real part of America.").
" See Steurele & Bakija, supra note 31, at 39; FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY, supra
note 11, at 24 ("retirement insurance was not the only objective of Social Security.
A major goal of the program that could not be served easily by private insurance
was to redistribute benefits to favor the poor.").
"1 Some analysts contend that the system as a whole effectively redistributes
income to lower-income workers. See, e.g., JOINT ECON. COMM., PAYROLL TAXES
AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME (1997); HENRY J. AARON, ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF SOCIAL SECURITY 80 (1982); PAUL LIGHT, STILL ARTFUL WORK: THE CONTINUING
POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 37 (1995); Richard V. Burkhauser &
Jennifer L. Warlick, Disentangling the Annuity from the Redistributive Aspects of
Social Security in the United States, 27 REV. OF INCOME AND WEALTH 401, 402,
408 (1981); Duggan et al., supra note 24, at 1; Dean R. Leimer, Projected Rates of
Return to Future Social Security Retirees Under Alternative Benefit Structures, in
POLICY ANALYSIS WITH SOCIAL SECURITY RESEARCH FILES 235 (U.S. Dep't of
Health, Educ. and Welfare Research Report No. 52, 1978); Martha N. Ozawa, Who
Receives Subsidies Through Social Security, And How Much?, 27 SOCIAL WORK: J.
NAT'L ASSN SOC. WORKERS 129, 131-32 (1982).
Others argue that factors such as the derivative benefit provisions, basing
[Vol. 64: 3
1998] REDISTRIBUTION: PARTIALLY PRIVATIZED SOCIAL SECURITY 989
been enormously successful in lifting the elderly out of pov-
erty. 2 In 1996, more than 90 percent of all "aged units," that
is, married couples living together with a spouse aged 65 or
older or individuals 65 or older who did not live with a
spouse,' received Social Security benefits.' Although those
benefits only represented 40 percent of all aged units' total
money income,85 its importance differed dramatically depend-
ing on the recipient's income status. It represented about 80
percent of the income for the two lowest quintiles of aged
units, while it only represented 21 percent of the income for
benefits on 35 working years, and lower-income workers' shorter life expectancies,
limit or eliminate the program's ability to redistribute income within generations
from higher-income workers to lower-income workers. See WILBUR J. COHEN &
MILTON FRIEDMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY: UNIVERSAL OR SELECTIVE? 35 (1972); PETER
J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION 54-57, 292 (1980);
Henry J. Aaron, Demographic Effects on the Equity of Social Security Benefits, in
THE EcONOMICS OF PUBLIC SERVICES 151 (Martin S. Feldstein & Robert P. Inman
eds., 1977); David M. Garrett, The Effects of Differential Mortality Rates on the
Progressivity of Social Security, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 457 (1995); and Martha N.
Ozawa, Income Redistribution and Social Security, 50 SOC. SERV. REV. 209, 219
(1976); Assessing Social Security Reform Alternatives: A Report on EBRIs, POL'Y
FORUM (Dec. 4, 1996).
Commentators similarly dispute the system's treatment of minorities. For
arguments that the system redistributes income away from non-whites due to their
shorter life expectancy, see, for example, FRANK G. DAVIS, THE BLACK
COMMUNITY'S SOCIAL SECURITY 86, 112-13 (1977); Geoffrey T. Holtz, Note, Social
Security Discrimination Against African-Americans: An Equal Protection Argument,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 108-10 (1996); Michael D. Hurd & John B. Shoven, The
Distributional Impact of Social Security, in PENSIONS, LABOR, AND INDIVIDUAL
CHOICE 193, 212 (David A. Wise ed., 1985); Walter Williams, Little Abuses Add Up
to Height of Injustice, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 20, 1994, at F3, available in
1994 WL 6302475. For arguments that factors such as the weighted benefit for-
mula and the disability benefit provisions result in redistribution to nonwhites,
see, for example, KINGSON & BERKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 125-26; Duggan et al.,
supra note 24, at 8; Leimer supra; see also U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC.
1978-1979, REPORT OF THE 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY 125
(1980) (concluding that Social Security does not treat minorities less favorably but
noting that treatment of minorities is complex).
2 See Peter M. Wheeler & John R. Kearney, Income Protection for the Aged in
the 21st Century: A Framework to Help Inform the Debate, 59 SOC. SECURITY
BULL. 3, 5 (1996) ("In the United States, Social Security has been instrumental in
bringing about a significant reduction in poverty among the aged. Although the
aged poverty rate continues to be higher than in many European countries, it has
remained for several years below the poverty rate for the population as a whole.").
'3 SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., 1996 INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK ii (July 1998)
[hereinafter AGED CHARTBOOK].
84 Id. at 8.
Id. at 15.
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the highest quintile. Currently, 9 percent of aged beneficiaries
receive a total income that falls below the poverty line.86
Without Social Security, however, the income of 50 percent of
aged beneficiaries would fall below the poverty line.87
Not only has Social Security helped lift many of the elderly
out of poverty, but it has done so without many of the prob-
lems of pure welfare programs. Programs for the poor tend to
be just that, poor.8" Means-tested programs tend to stigmatize
recipients and create work and savings disincentives.89 By
blending redistributive objectives with equitable provisions,
Social Security has avoided these problems. Recipients can
accept the benefits with pride because their contributions help
pay for the benefits." In addition, the benefit formula retains
work incentives by providing retirees with absolutely larger
88 Id. at 10. For the current poverty guidelines, see U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Annual Update of the Health and Human Servs. Poverty Guide-
lines, 63 F.R. 9235, 9236 (1998).
87 AGED CHARTBOOK, supra note 83, at 10. For a more lengthy discussion of
the role Social Security plays in the well-being of the elderly, see KINGSON &
BERKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 71-86.
88 See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 2, at 217 (noting that it was a dictum of
program executives that "a program for the poor is a poor program.").
89 See Paul Starr, Social Security and the American Public Household, in SO-
CIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 119, 139 (1988) ("Means-tested
programs also have perverse incentives, which conservatives themselves frequently
emphasize. Rather than seeing their savings eaten away gradually until they qual-
ify for such a program, some of the aged would divest themselves of their assets,
transferring them to their children."). In addition, means-tested programs tend to
have high administrative costs while Social Security's old-age program has very
low administrative costs. See Thompson, Overview, supra note 30, at 8 & n.12
(noting that "Itihe annual administrative costs for the U.S. Old-Age and Survivors
social insurance program average about 0.8 percent of annual benefit payments.
By comparison, the administrative costs of the parallel means-tested program for
the aged and disabled operated by the same agency averages about 7.6 percent of
benefit payments.").
'0 See ALICIA MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 85 (1977) (contribu-
tory financing of Social Security allows workers to receive benefits as earned right
rather than as a dole); Wilbur J. Cohen, The Social Security Act of 1935: Reflec-
tions Fifty Years Later, in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5, 13 (describing
Social Security as "a way of assuring the dignity and independence of the individ-
ual, the integrity of the family, and the stability and purchasing power of the
community."); see also Thompson, Overview, supra note 30, at 7 (noting that "social
insurance promotes individual respect and dignity through the philosophy that
those who make contributions have earned the right to the benefits .... In con-
trast, those who receive means-tested benefits are often stigmatized.").
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benefits the more they contribute to the system."1 Finally,
since there is no means-test, there is no incentive to dis-save
upon reaching retirement age.
Admittedly, not all of Social Security redistributive provi-
sions are free from criticism. Indeed, its auxiliary or derivative
benefits are subject to a great deal of criticism." The fact that
it may be appropriate to amend Social Security's derivative
benefit provisions,93 however, does not suggest that all of So-
cial Security's redistributive provisions should be abandoned.
Rather, its weighted benefit formula, which is designed to en-
sure lower-income workers socially adequate retirement bene-
fits, should be preserved. As the only source of retirement in-
91 Of course, Social Security, itself, may create work disincentives for the elder-
ly. Those disincentives, however, to the extent that they exist, are due more to
the provision of retirement benefits in the first place (and Social Security's earn-
ings test) than to the program's redistributive provisions. See generally Rachel
Floersheim Boaz, Labor Market Behavior of Older Workers Approaching Retirement:
A Summary of the Evidence from the 1970s, in SOCIAL SECURITY: A CRITIQUE OF
THE RADICAL REFORM PROPOSALS 103 (1987) (discussing studies on Social
Security's effect on labor supply incentives and concluding that Social Security has
limited role in encouraging older workers to leave the workforce); Michael V.
Leonesio, The Effects of the Social Security Earnings Test on the Labor-Market
Activity of Older Americans: A Review of the Evidence, 53 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 2
(1990) (describing studies and concluding that earnings test has fairly small im-
pact on labor supply of older Americans); Thompson, Overview, supra note 30, at 9
(noting that economists have found that work effort would be somewhat higher in
the absence of social welfare benefits).
92 See, e.g., MIMI ABRAMov1Tz, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WEL-
FARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 259 (1996) (criticizing deriva-
tive benefit provisions for devaluing women's domestic work and enforcing their
subordination to men); Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimina-
tion, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 280 n.85 (1989) (same); Richard V. Burkhauser, Are
Women Treated Fairly in Today's Social Security System, 19 GERONTOLOGIST 242
(1979) (arguing that Social Security derivative benefit provisions are based on out-
dated norms and system should be adjusted to take into account changing role of
women); Jonathan Barry Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retire-
ment Program: Partial Integration and a Credit for Dual-Earner Couples, 45 TAX
LAW. 915, 94447, 957-69 (1992) (proposing partial integration of Social Security
program and individual income tax); Garrett, supra note 81, at 457 (arguing that
derivative benefit provisions are inefficient because they discourage secondary earn-
ers from working); Nancy M. Gordon, The Treatment of Women Under Social Secu-
rity, in 1 DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PENSION AND
HEALTH, LIFE, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE 410 (1978) (analyzing earnings-sharing
and homemaker credit proposals designed to eliminate inequities in current deriva-
tive benefit provisions).
' In fact, a number of partial privatization proposals would amend the deriv-
ative benefit provisions as well as create individual accounts. See supra note 44.
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come for many retired low-income workers, Social Security
should remain a "floor of protection on which private-sector
economic security measures can be built."94
CONCLUSION
In theory, partially privatizing Social Security need not
upset the system's balance between equity and social adequa-
cy. In fact, however, most proposals to privatize partially So-
cial Security sever the program's equitable component from its
redistributive role. In so doing, the partial privatization pro-
posals place Social Security's redistributive role, perhaps the
fundamental justification for the system, at risk.
Although proponents of complete privatization may find
that prediction comforting, those who respect Social Security's
redistributive role should find it of concern. Social Security has
been enormously successful in lifting the elderly out of poverty.
Moreover, it has done so without stigmatizing the elderly or
creating work or savings disincentives. If Social Security is
partially privatized, it may be effective in providing retirement
income for some middle- and higher-income workers. Its role in
providing a floor of protection for all retired workers, however,
may be compromised.
9' MYERS, supra note 3, at 231. For a detailed discussion of the appropriate
role of Social Security in our national retirement system, see Moore, supra note 9,
at 162-68.
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